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Abstract 
We investigated priming of analogical problem solutions with true and false 
memories.  Children and adults were asked to solve nine verbal proportional 
analogies, three of which had been primed by Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) 
lists where the critical lure (and problem solution) was presented as the initial word in 
the list (true memory priming), three of which were primed by DRM lists whose 
critical lures were the solution to the verbal proportional analogies (false memory 
priming), and three that were unprimed.  We controlled for age differences in solution 
rates (knowledge base) in order to examine developmental differences in speed-of-
processing.  As anticipated, the results showed that adults completed the problems 
significantly faster than children.  Furthermore, both children and adults solved 
problems primed with false memories significantly faster than either those primed 
with true memories or unprimed problems.  For both age groups there was no 
significant difference between solution times for unprimed and true primed problems.  
These findings demonstrate that (a) priming of problem solutions extends to verbal 
proportional analogies, (b) false memories are more effective at priming problem 
solutions than true memories, and (c) there are clear positive consequences to the 
production of false memories.  
 
Keywords: Priming, Analogical Reasoning, False memory, Memory development, 
DRM paradigm. 
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Priming Children’s and Adults’ Analogical Problem Solutions with  
True and False Memories 
That the human memory system is a fallible system is without question (e.g., 
see Howe, 2011a; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011).  Although a number of 
paradigms have established that memory is a powerful yet reconstructive system that 
is prone to error, it is perhaps the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm that 
has provided us with the quintessential evidence for this in terms of spontaneous false 
memory illusions (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  In this paradigm, 
participants are presented with associated words (e.g., snooze, doze, wake, rest) that 
are all semantic associates of an unpresented critical lure (e.g., sleep).  When 
subsequently asked to remember the words on the list, both children, and to a greater 
extent adults, frequently remember many of the presented words along with the 
unpresented critical lure.  Thus, like true memories, false memory production also 
increases with age (see Brainerd & Reyna, 2012; Howe, 2011b).  
 Typically, false memories are viewed as a negative consequence of our 
reconstructive memory system, a type of memory that might lead to miscarriages of 
justice (Loftus, 2003).  However, recent research has demonstrated that the 
production of false memories need not always have negative implications (see Howe, 
2011a; Newman & Lindsay, 2009; Schacter et al., 2011).  For example, research has 
demonstrated that false memories (i.e., DRM critical lures) are capable of priming 
performance on implicit memory tasks such as word-stem completions (McDermott, 
1997; McKone & Murphy, 2000) or anagrams (Lövdén and Johansson, 2003).  
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Extending these findings, Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, and Ball (2010a) 
demonstrated that false memories also prime solutions to more complex tasks, 
namely, insight-based problem-solving tasks.  Using the compound remote associate 
task (CRAT) initially developed by Mednick (1962), participants were required to 
generate a single word that linked three presented words (e.g., board/mail/magic 
where the linking solution word is black).  Howe et al. (2010a) demonstrated that 
adult participants solved more CRATs more quickly when primed with a false 
memory than when no prime was presented.  This finding has been replicated and 
extended to include priming in children (Howe, Garner, Charlesworth & Knott, 2011).  
Like the generation of spontaneous false memories in the DRM paradigm, 
solving CRAT problems is believed to involve a process of spreading activation, a 
link shared with the associative-activation account of false memories (Howe, 
Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Howe et al., 2010a, 2011).  If both CRAT 
problems and false memories utilize the same spreading activation mechanism, it 
seems as if CRAT problems provide an ideal platform from which to demonstrate 
priming effects with false memories (Howe et al., 2010a).  However, despite these 
novel findings, one could argue that the priming of CRAT problems within this 
paradigm is not necessarily the priming of complex problem solving per se, but rather, 
simply the priming of more distant word associations. 
The aim of the present research was to establish whether priming with false 
memories could also be applied to more complex reasoning tasks, ones that go 
beyond “simple” word associations.  To this end, we selected verbal proportional 
analogies of the type “a is to b, as c is to d” (e.g., “grass is to green as banana is to 
yellow”).  In analogical reasoning tasks, participants are usually presented with “a is 
to b, as c is to ?” and are expected to generate the d term.  These types of analogies 
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are frequently used in intelligence tests (Sternberg, 1977) and academic examinations 
such as the statutory assessment test.  Several permutations of this basic proportional 
analogy exist, including pictorial analogies (Goswami & Brown, 1990), as well as 
multiple-choice versions that rely on participants’ discriminating the correct d term 
rather than generating it themselves.  According to Green, Fugelsang, and Dunbar 
(2006), analogical reasoning problems are solved by mapping the relationship 
between terms a and b onto the c term in order to generate the answer, d.  
The exact processes that underlie children and adults analogical problem 
solving are believed to change with development (e.g., Ball, Hoyle, & Towse, 2010; 
Goswami, 1991, 1992, 2001; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980).  Whereas it is believed that 
children solve proportional analogies by a process of semantic association (much like 
the spreading activation processes thought to underlie CRAT solutions; see Sternberg 
& Nigro, 1980), adults are believed to employ processes of analogical reasoning 
where the link between a and b placed onto the c term to generate d.  Although it is 
well known that it is possible to prime abstract analogical relations (see Green et al., 
2006), to the best of our knowledge, the present experiment provides the first 
demonstration of priming analogical solutions using both true and false memories in 
children as well as in adults.   
Because there are well-established differences in how children and adults 
solve analogical problems (see earlier discussion), we were not interested in these 
developmental changes in the rates at which problems can be solved.  That is, most 
theories of memory development, including associative-activation theory (e.g., Howe 
et al., 2009) and theories concerning the role of knowledge representations in memory 
processing (e.g., Ceci, Fitneva, & Williams, 2010), acknowledge the existence of 
important differences in the structure and content of children’s and adults’ knowledge 
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base that can affect performance on memory tasks (also see Howe, 2011b).  However, 
our interest is in whether children’s and adults’ speed-of-processing during problem 
solving can be affected by primes independent of age differences in problem 
difficulty.  That is, given that knowledge base differences are eliminated in a 
problem-solving task, do adults still process information more rapidly than children.  
Moreover, we were interested in whether priming affects both children’s and adults’ 
problem solution rates and if so, whether these effects are developmentally invariant 
both qualitatively in terms of prime type (i.e., true memory primes versus false 
memory primes) and quantitatively (i.e., speed performance by the same magnitude). 
Thus, the purpose of this experiment is to examine whether true and false 
memory priming enhances the speed of analogical reasoning in both children and 
adults when solution rate (problem difficulty) is equated across age.  To this end, we 
used analogical reasoning problems that both adults and children were able to 
complete relatively easily (hence no solution rate differences were expected) and 
examined whether priming speeds solution times.  In addition, because false 
memories have been shown to serve as better primes than true memories (see Howe, 
Wilkinson, & Monaghan, 2012), we speculated that spontaneous, self-generated, false 
memories would be better primes for analogical problem solving than experimenter-
provided true memories for both children and adults.  
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 41 individuals (20 male and 21 female) participated in the 
experiment: twenty-five 9-year-olds (M = 9 years, 4 months, SD = 9 months) and 16 
adults (M = 22 years, 3 months, SD = 2 months).  Parental consent was obtained for 
each child participant, as well as the child’s own assent on the day of testing.  Adult 
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participants provided written informed consent prior to taking part in the study.  All 
participants were fluent in English.  Adult participants were debriefed after 
participating in the experiment.  
Design 
 A 2 (Age: 7- or 18-year-olds) x 3 (Priming: true memory prime, or false 
memory prime, or unprimed) mixed design was employed.  Age was a between-
participants and priming of solution a within-participant factor.  Primed problems 
were analyzed for those participants that either correctly recalled the presented critical 
lure (true memory priming), falsely recalled the critical lure (false memory priming), 
or where the solution was unprimed.   
Materials and Procedure 
 There were 9 DRM lists selected for use in this experiment.  DRM lists were 
either selected from standard sources of DRM list materials (e.g., Roediger, Watson, 
McDermot, & Gallo, 2001) or were constructed based on normed associates by 
Nelson, McEvoy, and Schrieber (2004).  Each DRM list consisted of 12 words (e.g., 
shoe, hand, toe, walk) each of which is associated with an unpresented target or 
“critical lure” item (e.g., foot) (see Appendix).  The lists for false memory primes 
contained 12 associates of the unpresented critical lure, whereas the lists for true 
memory primes contained 11 of these associates with the lowest associate being 
replaced with the critical lure for that list in the first presentation position. The first 
serial position was chosen for the critical lure to ensure that this term was “other” 
generated rather than “self” generated.  That is, the processing of prior related items 
before presentation of the critical lure could cause activation of the critical lure before 
it was actually presented, something that would lead to it being self rather than other 
generated.  By using the first serial position in the DRM list, we ensured that in our 
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true memory priming condition, the critical lure was other generated, whereas in the 
false memory priming condition, the critical lure was self generated by the 
participant.  The final item of the list was removed in the true memory condition in 
order to ensure that the overall backward associative strength (BAS; a key factor 
determining the probability of producing false memories) of the list did not vary 
greatly between the true and false memory priming conditions.  Associate words that 
overlapped with the items presented in the analogical problems were removed and 
replaced with another associate.  In this way, DRM list items were not also part of any 
subsequent analogy items (see Appendix). 
Participants were tested individually and were first presented with six of the 
nine DRM lists in randomized order. Three of the lists contained the true memory 
prime for three of the subsequently presented analogies (i.e., the first presented item 
in the list was the critical-lure/analogy-solution) and three that did not contain the 
critical lure for three of the subsequently presented analogies (i.e., the critical-
lure/analogy solution would be the associated but unpresented critical for each of the 
three lists).  Each list was presented verbally by the experimenter and was followed 
by a brief distractor task (counting backwards by three’s).  Participants were then 
asked to recall as many words as they could remember from each of the lists.  
Following recall, the next list was presented and this sequence of study-distractor-test 
continued until all six lists were completed.  Once participants had listened to all six 
DRM lists, they then proceeded to complete a practice analogical reasoning problem, 
before completing nine test analogical reasoning problems.  
Presentation of the DRM lists according to their link to the solution type in the 
unprimed, true memory prime, and false memory prime conditions was fully 
counterbalanced, such that each DRM list and associated analogical problem appeared 
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equally often across participants within each age in each solution-type condition.  
Participants were presented, in randomized order, the nine analogical reasoning 
problems in the format of “a is to b as c is to d”.  For example, the analogy for the 
critical lure “foot” was “hat is to head as sock is to foot”. Participants provided their 
answers verbally to the experimenter.  The time taken for them to complete the 
analogical problem, from presentation of the analogical problem to production of the 
response, was recorded by the experimenter with the use of a stopwatch.  The 
experimenter was blind to which analogies corresponded to which priming condition 
participants were in, with the experimenter not knowing which analogies were primed 
with a true memory or which analogies were primed with a false memory. Similarly, 
the experimenter was blind to whether participants recalled the critical lure or not, 
until after completion of the study.  Participants were given a maximum of 60 seconds 
to provide an answer.  As expected, each participant provided an answer well within 
this 60-second limit. 
Results 
We begin, by analyzing recall rates for the critical lure both when it was 
presented as part of the list (true memory condition) and when it was not part of the 
list (false memory condition) for adults and children using a mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA).  When this recall type (true vs. false) x age (children vs. adults) 
ANOVA was conducted, there was no effect for age, F(1, 39) = 1.90, p =.18, and no 
Age x Recall Type interaction, F(1, 39) = 3.60, p = .065.  However, there was a main 
effect for recall type F(1, 39) = 89.18, p < .001, η2p = .70.  As expected, recall of the 
critical lure when it was presented at study (86%; raw mean = 2.60, SD = .59) was 
greater than recall of the critical lure when it was not presented at study (46%; raw 
mean = 1.37, SD = .80). 
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We turn now to an examination of the analogy data.  Here, the mean analogy 
solution rate (proportion) and the mean analogy solution time (seconds) were 
calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in two ANOVAs.  For the 
primed analogy problems, solution rates and times were divided into the type of 
solution prime (i.e. unprimed vs. true memory prime vs. false memory prime).  
Therefore, both the solution rates and solution times were subject to 2 (Age) x 3 
(Priming) mixed ANOVAs.   
As anticipated, there were no significant effects associated with solution rates.  
That is, there was no main effect of age, F(1, 34) = .23, p > .05, or priming, F(2, 68) 
= 1.47, p > .05.  The Age x Priming interaction also was not significant F(2, 68) = 
.51, p > .05.  Again, as expected, the participants were at or near ceiling regardless of 
age or type of priming (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Mean proportion and standard error of solution rates according to  
 age and priming. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also as anticipated, there were significant differences in solution times as a 
function of age and priming.  Specifically, there was a significant main effect of age, 
 
Priming 
 
Children 
 
 
Adults 
 
Unprimed 
 
 
True Memory Prime 
 
 
False Memory Prime 
 
 
1.0 (.0) 
 
 
.97 (.23) 
 
 
1.0 (.0) 
 
.97 (.15) 
 
 
.97(.33) 
 
 
1.0 (.0) 
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F(1, 34) = 13.44, p < .001, η2p  = .28.  Solution times were significantly faster for the 
adults (M = 2.91, SE = .33) than for the children (M = 4.40, SE = .23).  In addition, 
there was a significant main effect of priming on solution times, F(2, 68) = 7.60, p < 
.001, η2p  = .18.   
 
Figure 1. Mean proportion and standard error rates of solution times according to age  
 and type of solution. 
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post-hoc tests (Tukey’s LSD) showed that analogical reasoning times were fastest for 
the false memory primed problems (M = 2.70, SE = .17).  These problems were 
significantly faster than both the true memory primed problems (M = 4.40, SE = .48, 
p < .001) and the unprimed problems (M = 3.86, SE = .17, p < .001). There was no 
significant difference in solution times between the unprimed and true memory 
primed problems (p > .05). 
Discussion 
These findings provide a unique and important demonstration that false 
memories are more effective at priming solutions to analogical problems than true 
memories, both for children and adults.  Our specific interest in the current study was 
with whether true and false memory priming could facilitate children’s and adults’ 
speed of analogical reasoning and not whether there were age differences in 
analogical problem solving per se (as these effects are already well established; e.g., 
see Ball et al., 2010; Goswami, 1991, 1992, 2001).  Because of this, we intentionally 
selected analogies that could be easily solved by both children and adults and did not 
expect, nor did we obtain, age differences in solution rates.  We did, however, 
anticipate age and priming differences in speed of problem solving given what we 
know about differences in the structure of children’s knowledge base (e.g., see Ceci et 
al., 2010; Howe, 2011b).  That is, despite having the knowledge available to solve 
analogical problems, children’s speed of processing during problem solving is thought 
to be slower relative to that of adults (see Howe et al., 2009, 2011).  The question, 
then, was whether speed of processing could be affected by true and false memory 
primes in both children and adults. 
What the current results show is that both children’s and adults’ speed-of-
problem-solving was affected by priming (specifically, false memory primes) and that 
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these effects were age invariant.  That is, although children were still slower than 
adults (the main effect for age), solution times were significantly faster, and faster by 
the same magnitude, regardless of age for problems that were primed by false 
memories.  No advantage was obtained for priming with true memories.  This finding 
not only has implications for priming work per se, but also for the debate surrounding 
the differences and similarities of true and false memories (e.g. Diliberto-Macaluso, 
2005; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  In terms of priming of higher order reasoning 
tasks, there appears to be a clear distinction between true and false remembering.  
Importantly, this provides further evidence for the beneficial effects of false memories 
in a problem-solving domain.  
That only false memory primes were effective in speeding up analogical 
problem solving in both children and adults is quite interesting given the recent 
literature on the superiority of self-generated (e.g., spontaneous false memories) over 
other-generated (e.g., experimenter-presented true memories) information more 
generally in memory (e.g., Howe et al., 2012).  That is, self-generated information is 
better retained than other-generated information in adults (e.g., Mulligan & Lozito, 
2004) as well as children (Howe, 2006).  Because critical lures from DRM lists, if not 
explicitly presented as part of the list (as they were in our true memory condition), 
when falsely remembered, can be considered to be self-generated information.  In 
contrast to conditions where information is already on the list, or other-generated 
information, this self-generated information tends to be stronger and more durable in 
memory.  Indeed, there is a considerable literature demonstrating the strength and 
persistence of false (self-generated) memories over time (ranging from 1-2 days to 1-
2 weeks) as well as the rapid decline of true (other-generated) memories over that 
same delay (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Brandse, 1995; Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, 
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& Wimmer, 2010b; Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; Seamon et al., 2002; 
Thapar & McDermott, 2001).  In fact, we have recently demonstrated that not only do 
false memories make better primes than true memories for CRAT problem solving 
over a 1-week retention interval (Howe et al., 2012) but that self-generated 
information is better at priming these same CRAT problems than experimenter-
generated information and these effects are also developmentally invariant (Wilkinson 
& Howe, 2013).  It may be, then, that false memories are stronger than true memories 
just like self-generated information is more memorable than other-generated 
information.  If the strength of the memory representation is important to the strength 
or power of priming effects, then false or self-generated memories may be expected to 
have a greater effect on the speed of problem solving over true or other-generated 
memories when used as primes. 
In summary, the current study not only extends earlier work on false memory 
priming of problem solving, but also provides a novel test of the hypothesis that false 
memories can and do have positive consequences on higher-level cognitive processes.  
By using more difficult analogical reasoning problems, ones that cannot always be 
solved associatively, we have demonstrated that false memories can aid subsequent 
problem solving in situations requiring more complex reasoning.  Thus, it is clear that 
the impact of false memory priming on problem solving tasks is not just restricted to 
children’s and adults’ CRAT problems (Howe et al., 2010a, 2011), but also extends to 
more complex reasoning tasks such as verbal analogical reasoning.  That is, the 
current contribution is also important because false memory priming of CRAT 
solutions might be seen as simply representing the priming of distant word 
associations in a network of such associations.  Importantly, the evidence here 
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demonstrates that priming, and in particular the superior effects of false memory 
priming, extend to analogical reasoning tasks.   
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Appendix 
 
Analogies and DRM Lists 
 
Water : Boat :: Road : Car 
 
Car – truck, bus, train, vehicle, drive, jeep, Ford, race, keys, garage, highway,  
 van. 
 
Moon : Night :: Sun : Day 
 
Day – week, rainy, month, calendar, year, Tuesday, birth, date, Wednesday,  
 evening, hour. 
 
       Hat : Head :: Sock : Foot 
 
Foot - shoe, hand, toe, kick, sandals, soccer, yard, walk, ankle, arm, boot,  
 inch. 
 
          Rock : Hard :: Pillow : Soft 
  
Soft – light, plush, loud, cotton, fur, touch, feather, furry, downy, kitten, skin,  
 tender. 
 
         Hare : Fast :: Tortoise : Slow 
 
Slow - lethargic, stop, listless, snail, cautious, delay, traffic, turtle, hesitant,  
 speed, quick, sluggish. 
 
Stand : Floor :: Sit : Chair  
 
Chair – table, legs, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, wood, cushion, swivel,  
 stool, sitting. 
 
Tooth : Brush :: Hair : Wash 
 
Wash – rinse, dishes, mouth, scrub, laundry, soap, shampoo, dish, soak,  
 cloth, bathroom. 
    
        Desert : Hot :: Arctic : Cold 
 
Cold - snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, frigid, chilly, heat, weather, freeze, air,  
 shiver. 
 
Eyes: See :: Nose: Smell  
Smell – odour, aroma, scent, stench, skunk, stink, incense, sniff, perfume,  
 fragrance, deodorant, sense. 
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